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The government’s choices of the corporate tax rate and public investment are interdependent. 
In particular, they both respond positively to the other. Therefore, international tax 
competition not only drives corporate tax rates to lower levels but might also affect negatively 
the stock of public capital. We build a general equilibrium model that illustrates the relation 
between the two variables. We then add an element of international tax competition. Our 
simulations show that when international tax competition drives the statutory tax rate down 
from 45% to 30%, public investment is reduced by 0.4% of output at the steady state. The 
short run effect is three times higher. The second part of our study displays an empirical 
analysis that corroborates the main outcome of the model. We estimate two policy functions 
for 21 OECD countries and find that corporate tax rate and public investment are endogenous. 
More precisely, a decline of 15% in the corporate tax rate reduces public investment by 0.6% 
to 1.1% of GDP. We also find evidence that international competition operates on both policy 
tools. 
JEL Code: H0, H26, H54. 
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Over the past 30 years, there has been a downward trend in two distinct government policy tools.
On the one hand, statutory corporate tax rates have gone down in the majority of OECD countries
from around 45% to 30%. On the other hand, public investment has declined from an average of
4.5% of GDP to below 3% of GDP. As a consequence, public capital stock has fallen by 10% of
GDP (see Figure 1 below). In contrast, government consumption has increased during this period.
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The decline in statutory corporate tax rate is a well documented phenomenon. It is usually
attributed to international tax competition and a higher degree of capital and proﬁt mobility.1
In contrast, the literature examining the downward trend in public investment is scarcer and
far less compelling.2 In a way, the decline of public investment and public capital stock is a
puzzle. B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e, Gobalraja, and Trannoy (2007), among others, show for instance that the
location of multinational ﬁrms does not entirely depend on national tax policies but also on ‘public
infrastructure’, partly because of its positive eﬀect of the productivity of private capital. Under
these circumstances, the relationship displayed in Figure 1 could appear counter-intuitive: in a
more competitive environment we would indeed expect countries to increase their stock of public
capital (at the expense of public consumption) in order to attract more private investment.
We argue that these two phenomenons are related. Firstly, we claim that there is an intrinsical
relation between corporate tax and public investment, beyond the simple identity of the government
budget constraint. On the one hand, if the tax rate is high, governments spend more in public
investment, relative to government consumption . The intuition for this is the following. The
1See for instance Krogstrup (2004).
2Some frequent explanations for the decline of public investment include: the increase of privatization, the increase
of private-public partnerships, the smaller role of the government or, in the case of Europe, the need for ﬁscal
stringency. Some of these explanations are not very convincing as argued by Mehrotra and V¨ alil¨ a (2006). First, under
national accounts, the investment undertaken by public enterprizes counts as private investment. Only investment
recorded and ﬁnanced from the budget counts as public investment . Second, private and public partnership is a
very recent phenomenon that could not account for the pattern observed since the 1970s. Furthermore, government
consumption has increased during the same period for most OECD countries. See Balassone and Franco (2000).
2existence of public capital creates rents for the ﬁrms. Part of these rents are appropriated by the
government through the corporate taxation. In a way corporate taxation can be seen as a return
on public investment. If the tax rate is at high levels, a government that cares about revenue (or
cares about the distortions of raising revenue) tends to favour public investment, at the expenses of
government consumption. On the other hand, the level of tax rate also depends positively on the
level of public capital. The higher the level of public capital, the higher the rents for the ﬁrm. The
ﬁrm is, therefore, able to support a higher tax burden on its proﬁt. Both policy variables respond
positively to each other and the two are jointly determined.
Given the endogenous relation between corporate tax rate and public investment, we argue that
the increase in the international tax competition, that has been exogenously driving the corporate
tax rate down over the past years, caused, as a side eﬀect, the reduction of public investment.
To make our case, we ﬁrst build a model where the decision-maker decides on a corporate tax
policy, but also chooses how to allocate its public resource. In this respect, the government has two
alternatives: it can either invest (and therefore increase the stock of public capital) or allocate its
tax receipts into “unproductive” government consumption. Additionally, we consider an element
of tax competition to assess the short and long run macroeconomic implications of a greater degree
of corporate tax competition. We, then, perform an empirical analysis for 21 OECD countries for
the period between 1966 and 2002.
In line with Pouget and St´ eclebout-Orseau (2008), our model attempts to illustrate the inter-
dependence between statutory tax rates and productive spending. We develop our analysis in a
general equilibrium setting and in this way we aim to provide a realistic quantitative analysis. In our
two-country model, governments can enlarge their tax base by deciding on a more accommodating
corporate tax rate or by increasing the stock of productive public capital (or public infrastructures).
Because the exact source of tax competition does not aﬀect the main mechanism of the model, we
focus on proﬁt shifting as opposed to capital mobility. Due to the growing internalization of the
corporate sector, particularly in Europe, multinational companies have increased their ability to
change the location of their declared proﬁt in response to tax rates diﬀerentials for tax avoidance
purposes.3 Our simulations indicate that, following a decline of 15% in tax rate (driven by increas-
ing competition), public investment in steady state diminishes between 0.2% and 0.4% of output.
This leads to a drop in the steady state public capital stock over output ranging from 4 to 11 per-
centage points. We also perform simulation on the transition between steady states and ﬁnd that
3Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) performed an empirical analysis based on OECD countries and estimate in their
baseline scenario that 65% of the additional revenue from a unilateral tax increase is lost due to a decrease in the
reported proﬁt to the national tax authorities. See also Huizinga and Laeven (2007) who have calculated that the
average semi-elasticity of reported proﬁts with respect to the top statutory tax rate. In particular, Germany appears
to have lost considerable tax revenues due to proﬁt mobility -see Weichenrieder (2007). For other contributions on
international tax competition and proﬁt shifting, see Kind, Midelfart, and Schjelderup (2005), and Elitzur and Mintz
(1996).
3the short run impact on public investment can be up to three times larger than the long run eﬀect.
We also create diﬀerent scenarios and challenge the robustness of the relationship. In all cases,
international tax competition reduces the share of public spending allocated to public investment,
therefore reducing the stock of public capital.
In the empirical part we estimate two endogenous policy functions of corporate tax rate and
public investment that also respond to their foreign counterpart. Evidence conﬁrms the endogene-
ity and the complementarity between the two tools: tax rate increases with the level of public
investment and public investment increases with the tax rate. We ﬁnd that a decline in tax rate
of 15%, reduces public investment by 0.6% to 1.1% of GDP. Further evidence suggests that both
tools are driven by competition, particularly te corporate tax rate.
The next section of this paper introduces the theoretical model by presenting the main assump-
tions and mechanisms in a partial equilibrium setting. In the third section we calibrate the model
and present the quantitative results. The empirical analysis is presented in the fourth section. The
last section concludes.
2 The Model
The general equilibrium model consists of two countries denoted A and B. National governments
decide on a tax rate levied on the beneﬁts of the corporate sector and allocate their tax receipts
either to “productive” public investment or public consumption. The corporate sector is introduced
through a single representative multinational ﬁrm producing a homogeneous good in both countries.
Capital is perfectly mobile between the two countries and the ﬁrm can borrow at a world interest
rate. Since the two national tax bases are not consolidated, the corporate sector has the ability to
shift proﬁt in order to reduce its overall tax burden. However, these operations entail some costs.
We assume perfect foresight and no uncertainty.
2.1 The Households
In each country i (i ∈ {A;B}), a representative household derives its utility from both private
consumption and public spending. The instantaneous utility function at time t is given by:
Ui
t = lnci
t + ξ lngi
t + γ lnPi
t (1)
The utility derived from public spending depends ﬁrst on government consumption, gi
t, which covers
all current expenditures with no direct productive purposes. Additionally, the household’s utility
depends on the stock of public capital, denoted Pi
t. This stock represents a wide range of public
4infrastructures, such as roads or bridges, that are valuated by the representative household but also
used in the production process (see below). Therefore, in line with Keen and Marchand (1997),
our model relies on a clear-cut distinction between productive and non-productive government
spending. Parameters ξ and γ tell us that the representative household can valuate diﬀerently
these two categories of public spending.
In each country, the representative household takes public variables as given and maximizes the












t − ¯ t (2)
In each period, household’s resources are either consumed (ci
t) or saved by holding shares of the
private sector (Ii
t). We assume that the representative household supplies one unit of labour inelas-
tically and wage rate is set at wi
t. Total net resources depend also on the total amount of private
capital owned by the household, denoted Bi
t, which yields a gross return of rk
t and whose law of
motion (assume that the depreciation rate of private capital is δ) is:
Bi
t+1 = (1 − δ)Bi
t + Ii
t (3)
The household receives also dividends earned by the private sector: Υi
t (which will be deﬁned later
on). Besides, a lump sum tax on personal income, ¯ t, is levied in order to ﬁnance public policy. Note
that this speciﬁc tax rate will be considered exogenous in this model. Maximizing ˆ U(ci
t) subject to
(2) gives us the consumption pattern of the representative household, which is determined by the
following Euler condition (we deﬁne rt = rk
t − δ as the net interest rate):
ci
t+1 = ci
t(1 + rt+1)β (4)
2.2 The Corporate Sector
A single multinational ﬁrm operating in the two countries represents the private sector. It produces










The labor input, ni
t, is considered to be immobile between the two countries. By contrast, capital
is perfectly mobile and ki
t describes the total quantity of capital used in country i. Public capital
stock is included in the production function and, therefore, increases the marginal productivity of
capital. Pi
t is considered as given by the ﬁrm. The production technology is identical in the two
5countries.
A source-based corporate tax is applied on the declared proﬁt of the representative ﬁrm in the
two countries. Therefore, the aggregated net proﬁt of the corporate sector is as follows:
ΠTot
t = (1 − τA
t )ΓA























t represents the declared proﬁts of the ﬁrm in country i , and therefore its corporate tax base. We
assume that the ﬁrm can deduce capital depreciation from the taxable proﬁts.4 We deﬁne st > 0
(respect. < 0) the total amount of proﬁt shifted form country A to country B (respect. from
B to A). These proﬁt manipulations are costly to the ﬁrm since national tax authorities seek to
prevent tax evasion (for instance, transfer pricing distortions have to be justiﬁed). The function
ψ(st) capturing this cost is convex: ψ(0) = 0, ψs(st) > 0 and ψss(st) > 0.5 Following Kolmar and
Wagener (2007), we use the following functional form: ψ(St) = b(st)2.
By maximizing 6 with respect to ki
t, wi
t and st, we obtain the equations describing the behaviour












The total amount of capital used in country i is such that its marginal productivity equals the gross
cost of capital (which includes the cost of depreciation). Net cost of capital in a given country, υi
t,
increases with interest rates and corporate tax rate. Besides, because of the perfect mobility of
capital, a unique interest rate applies in the two countries. When the government increases the
total stock of public capital, Pi
t, this automatically increases ki∗
t due to its positive eﬀect on marginal
productivity of capital.
As one unit of labour is inelastically supplied in the two countries, the ﬁrm’s decision on labor




t ) = wi∗
t (8)
4Modeling this way implies that the statutory tax rate is equivalent to the eﬀective marginal tax rate. If we allow
the ﬁrm to deduce the ﬁnancial cost of capital, the eﬀective marginal tax rate would then be zero. This alternative
is less realistic and it does not change the mechanism of the model. The relation between public capital and tax rate
depends mainly on the statutory tax rate.
5This cost should be interpreted as the probability of being audit by the authorities, not being able to justify the
transfer prices, and consequently being ﬁned. We, therefore, assume that the marginal cost of tax evasion increases
with the total amount of proﬁt shifted.
6At last, the ﬁrm’s decision on paper proﬁt responds to the tax rate diﬀerential. Because ψs(st) > 0,
proﬁt will be shifted from A to B if τA − τB > 0. Proﬁt-shifting ﬂows are decreasing with the
























The purpose of the government is to maximize the present discounted value of the household lifetime
utility derived from public spending. In our model, the decision maker aims to increase public
spending ultimately and, therefore, behaves like a leviathan. This assumption should be seen as a
shortcut. The alternative would be to have two types of distortive taxation and a decision-maker
maximising the consumer’s utility. However, as we want to study the dynamic model, we would
need to approach this issue through the optimal dynamic taxation theory, which we want to avoid,
since it would lead us well beyond the scope of our study. To show that the main mechanism of
the model holds in a broader setting, in Appendix 2 we display a static model with optimal policy
and two distortionary taxes.6
Public resources in country i depend on the personal and corporate income tax revenue. Corpo-
rate tax revenue Ri
t depends on a statutory tax rate and the corporate tax base (i.e. the declared
proﬁt of the ﬁrm in country i).
gi
t + pi






















The second constraint the government faces is the law of motion equation of public capital stock
(δp is the rate of depreciation) :
Pi
t = (1 − δp)Pi
t−1 + pi
t (12)
We consider that the governments anticipate the outcome of their choice on the decisions of the
private sector. In this sense governments know that both their decision on tax rate and public
capital aﬀect the ﬁrm’s choice of capital (7), labour (8) and proﬁt shifting (9) and, therefore,
6An alternative way to interpret the government’s problem is to think the government maximizes consumer’s
lifetime utility, but is limited on the amount of taxes it can collect (¯ t). If the consumers have strong preferences for
the public goods, the supply of public goods is always below optimum. The level of consumption is very high and its
marginal beneﬁt too low compared to both public goods. In this case the government’s problem collapses to (10).
7the corporate revenue. Public decision consists of the choice of a statutory tax rate, τi
t and a
decision on public resources allocation between public investment and government consumption.
Each government decides simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The Lagrangian associated with























Not surprisingly, the government chooses τi










Since a corporate tax rate policy is decided simultaneously and non-cooperatively by the two coun-
tries, tax equilibrium between A and B is, thus, the outcome of a Nash game. Using (14) we obtain



































A corporate tax policy stance has two major determinants. Firstly, each government attempts to
maximize the revenue of its “productive” tax base, denoted ¯ Γ(.). This consists of the tax base that






























As one can observe on Figure 2, the revenue derived from this fraction of the tax base follows the
pattern of a traditional Laﬀer curve with respect to the corporate tax rate and is maximized for
τmax
i . When τi
t > τi
max, any corporate tax hike would entail a net loss, because the marginal revenue
would be oﬀset by the shrinking of the tax base.
The second determinant of a corporate tax policy is easily observed on (15): tax rate in a given
country is clearly responding to its partner’s tax rate. These strategic interactions describe a race
to the bottom phenomenon which is entirely dependent on proﬁt mobility. When b is low, the
multinational ﬁrm can engage proﬁt shifting operations forcing the two countries to compete more
(see Figure 3). On the other hand, if proﬁt shifting operations were no longer aﬀordable (b → +∞),
strategic interactions would disappear and corporate tax rates would be set at τi
max.
Having described in details the nature of tax competition in this model, we can now analyze
the determination of the stock of public capital in our model, given by the following ﬁrst order
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When maximizing (13) with respect to pi
t we obtain: λt = ξ/gi
t, so that the Lagrange multiplier
can be interpreted as the marginal cost of public investment in t (in terms of households foregone
utility of consumption of the public good). The right hand side represents the discounted beneﬁts of
investing on public capital. It is composed of the direct beneﬁt of public capital on the representative
household utility (γ/Pi
t+1). The second component of the beneﬁt refers to the anticipated eﬀect of
public capital stock on the tax revenue: investing more on public capital, will drive the multinational
ﬁrm to install more capital, thus bringing extra revenues in the future. This revenue may then be
used to supply a general public good to the population. The third component reﬂects the fact
that public capital is a durable good so these two eﬀects carry on to the following periods after
depreciation is accounted for.






Pi = r + δp (18)
The interpretation of (18) is very simple. The marginal beneﬁt of an increase of public capital
stock depends on its positive eﬀect on corporate tax revenue and the marginal utility that the
representative household derives from this public policy (which is of course decreasing with Pi).
The gross marginal cost increases with the interest rate and the depreciation rate of public capital
stock.
We can observe by the ﬁrst order conditions (14) and (17) that the two instruments used by
9the decision maker in order to collect corporate tax revenue are interdependent. We illustrate
this partial equilibrium relationship for country A on the Figure 4 below. Except for extreme
values of τA
t , the stock of public capital is increasing with the statutory tax rate. This pattern
directly depends on how strong is the impact of public capital on total corporate tax revenue
(∂Ri(Pi,τi,τj)/∂Pi), which obviously declines when tax rate takes lower values. Note that total
capital stock remains positive even when tax rate is equal to zero (indeed, as we can clearly see
on (18), public capital stock does provide a satisfaction to the representative household besides
increasing future tax revenue, so, it does not disappear even in the absence of corporate taxation).
On the other hand, tax rate depends positively on the level of public capital. The higher
the public capital, the higher the rents, so the higher the governments will set their tax rate.
Nevertheless, tax rate appears to be less reactive to public capital stock. In our model the tax
policy stance relies mostly on the level of tax competition and on the partner country’s tax rate.
Figure 4: Government’s ﬁrst order conditions
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The endogenous relation between public capital and corporate tax rate, which we describe above,
is not model speciﬁc. Under the ”leviathan” assumption, the government uses corporate tax rate
to maximize tax receipts and public investment partially to maximize future tax revenue. If we
assumed a perfectly benevolent government using two types of distortionary taxes to raise revenue,
a very similar intuition would hold. Firstly, the government would use a combination of taxes
to minimize the distortions needed to raise a certain amount of revenue. Public capital would,
nevertheless, still create rents and it would guarantee that part of the future revenue would be
non-distortionary. Thus, the higher the corporate tax rate, the higher the level of non-distortionary
revenue generated by a certain level of rents, so the higher the optimal level of public capital stock.
102.4 Market Clearing
In order to close the model we need three additional conditions. First we have the market clearing

















t + b(st)2 (19)
Total capital used by the ﬁrm equals to the amount of capital held by the households. Total
production in the two countries must equal to the total private and public consumption, private
and public investment and the cost of proﬁt shifting. Finally, we need a ﬁnal equation to pin down










In this section we analyze the quantitative implications of corporate tax competition for public
capital and public investment. The model is calibrated for an annual frequency. Table 1 shows the
values of the parameters and the implied steady state values for key variables.
The calibration of the ﬁrst four parameters is quite standard. The discount factor is such that
the annual real interest rate is 3.5%. In line with Kamps (2006), the annual rate of depreciation
of public capital is 5%. Its private counterpart is set at 8%. The elasticity of output with respect
to private capital is 0.26. The parameter θ is more controversial. Estimates of the elasticity of
output with respect to public capital range from 0 to 0.80. We set the value to 0.08 following a
meta-analysis study of Bom and Ligthart (2008).
The last three coeﬃcients are calibrated in order to obtain realistic steady state values for some
variables. The relative preference for the two types of public goods, γ/ξ, is such that public capital
stock as a share of output in equilibrium is 0.55. The lump sump tax ¯ t is such that the government
consumption in the economy is close to 22 percent of output. As we do not have any estimates
of the cost parameter of proﬁt shifting, b is set such that the corporate tax rate equilibrium is 30
percent. These three values are in line the evidence on OECD countries shown in the introduction.
7We deﬁned the dividend paid in country i as the total declared proﬁt minus the interest rate payment on existing
capital.
Υi




t − st) − rtki
t]
11Table 1: Calibration and steady state values in the benchmark case
Calibration Steady State
















0.08 k/y Private capital stock / output 2.00





0.182 τ Corporate tax rate 0.3
b Cost of proﬁt shifting 0.625 R/y Corporate tax revenue / output 0.054
3.2 Steady State Eﬀect of Competition
Starting from this baseline calibration, we now illustrate the consequences of tax competition on
public capital stock and other key variables in the economy. Figure 5 illustrates how the tax rate
equilibrium depends on the cost of proﬁt shifting. We observe that when proﬁt shifting becomes
more aﬀordable, a race to the bottom occurs. Not surprisingly in the extreme case of perfect proﬁt
mobility, tax rate is driven to zero.
The Figure 6 below shows how the steady state stocks of public capital and public investment
over output respond to changes in the tax rate (driven by the decline in b). Under the benchmark
scenario, a change of the statutory tax rate from 45% to 30% percent leads to a decline of public
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12Figure 6: Corporate tax rate and the allocation of public spending









0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70%
tax rate
Total Effect Excluding Revenue Effect








0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70%
tax rate
Total Effect Excluding Revenue Effect











0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70%
tax rate
Total Effect Excluding Revenue Effect
capital stock of 11% of output and a decline of public investment of 0.4% of output.
The overall eﬀect of increasing competition can be decomposed in two: the revenue and substi-
tution eﬀects. On the one hand, a decline in the tax rate automatically reduces total tax receipts,
thus reducing the level of public investment, as well as government consumption via the budget
identity. On the other hand, reduction of the tax rate makes public investment less attractive in
relation to government consumption, as discussed in the previous section. The overall decline might
be, however, over-estimated because of the inﬂuence of the revenue eﬀect. In reality, this eﬀect is
indeed likely to play a minor role since the total tax revenue derived from corporate taxation has
remained relatively stable despite the fall of the statutory tax rate. In order to isolate the substi-
tution eﬀect in our analysis, we artiﬁcially control for the revenue eﬀect by changing ¯ t such that
total revenue is kept constant (see the dash lines in Figure 6). The decline of public capital and
public investment would be slightly less than a half, 4% and 0.2% of output respectively.
Figure 7 illustrates the revenue and substitution eﬀects. As tax rate decreases, corporate tax
revenue goes down (left-hand side). In the case of extreme competition, corporate taxation dis-
appears. The substitution eﬀect is visible in the ratio between public investment and the general
public good. As tax rates are driven to lower levels, we indeed observe a shift in the composition
of public spending in favour of government consumption.
Figure 8 depicts the steady state response of some macroeconomic variables to changes in com-
petition. The stock of private capital as well as private consumption go up with the increase in the
tax competition. One might also expect that the race to the bottom of corporate tax rate always
has a positive eﬀect on total output. However, when tax rates reach very low levels, tax competition
turns out to be counter-productive to the total output. The hump-shape curve displayed on the
left-hand side is explained by the fact that public capital stock increases the marginal productivity
of private capital. This productivity deteriorates when tax competition reduces the stock of public
capital. When tax competition is strong, this negative eﬀect cannot be compensated by the increase
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in private capital. One can, therefore, observe that there exists a threshold tax rate under which
corporate tax competition is harmful to production.8
3.3 Dynamic eﬀects of competition
Our model allows us to study the transition dynamics. We analyse how the main variables of the
model respond to an increase in corporate tax rate competition from b = 0.705 (which implies a
tax rate of 35%) to b = 0.625 (baseline scenario with 30% tax rate).
One can see from the Figure 9 that tax rate declines immediately close to its new steady state
value once the shock occurs. Furthermore, public investment also drops sharply in response, then
picks up and converges to the new steady state. Simulations show that the short run eﬀect is
roughly three times higher than the long run eﬀect. In this particular case, a decline of the tax rate
by 5% has an immediate impact on public investment of 0.41% while the long run eﬀect is only
8Note that this threshold value is highly dependent on the value of the parameter θ. We do not explore this issue
further as our model is not indicated for welfare analysis.
14Figure 9: Response to an unanticipated permanent shock in b
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0.14%. This outcome occurs because the government readjusts his optimal stock public capital in
response to the decline of the tax rate. Not surprisingly, a greater degree of tax competition has a
positive eﬀect on the stock of private capital and on output.
3.4 Robustness analysis
3.4.1 Alternative calibration
Having described the main eﬀects of corporate tax competition on our benchmark model, we now
consider diﬀerent realistic scenarios. For all of them, we analyze the evolution of the public capital
stock, public investment and government consumption. We observe that the main conclusion of
the ﬁrst section is conﬁrmed: corporate tax competition has a negative impact on the stock of
15Table 2: Eﬀects of competition under alternative parameterizations
Public capital stock Public Investment
Parameters τ = 45% τ = 30% TE SE τ = 45% τ = 30% TE SE
1. θ = 0.12 77.2% 62.6% 14.6% 5.2% 3.1% 2.5% 0.6% 0.3%
2. θ = 0.04 56.5% 48.4% 8.1% 2.6% 2.3% 1.9% 0.3% 0.1%
3. α = 0.30 65.0% 52.5% 12.4% 4.4% 2.6% 2.1% 0.5% 0.2%
4. α = 0.2 67.2% 57.4% 9.8% 3.4% 2.7% 2.3% 0.4% 0.2%
5. γ/ξ = 0.22 76.1% 63.7% 12.4% 4.0% 3.0% 2.5% 0.5% 0.2%
6. γ/ξ = 0.14 55.7% 46.0% 9.7% 3.8% 2.2% 1.8% 0.4% 0.2%
7. ¯ t = 0.30 75.1% 63.7% 11.4% 4.3% 3.0% 2.5% 0.5% 0.2%
8. ¯ t = 0.18 57.1% 46.2% 10.8% 3.4% 2.3% 1.8% 0.4% 0.2%
public capital. The quantitative prediction is also quite robust. Public capital stock over GDP falls
between 8% and 15% of output and public investment between 0.3% and 0.6% of output under the
alternative scenarios. The substitution eﬀect accounts for close to half of the total eﬀect.
Since the value of the parameter θ has involved a lot of controversies, we test alternative values
for the contribution of public capital stock on private output (scenarios 1 and 2). For this reason,
and despite the fact that our calibration is in line with the recent estimations given in the literature,
we simulate two extreme cases. When Pi has a minor eﬀect on the output, the stock of public capital
is lower at the steady state and exhibits a lower variability in the tax rates. By contrast, when θ is
relatively high, we observe that tax competition entails a larger drop of public capital stock.
Allowing diﬀerent values for α (scenarios 3 and 4) aﬀects the substitutability between the private
and the public capital. Not surprisingly, when the production process relies more on private capital,
we observe a greater decline of public capital stock. Scenarios 5 and 6 describe the eﬀect of a change
of the relative preferences of the society for the two public policy dimensions. Without a doubt, the
relative preferences for public capital γ/ξ has a relatively high impact on the level of public capital
stock but less on its pattern. Diﬀerent preferences do not aﬀect the main mechanism of our model.
Analyzing the impact of the variation of the exogenous tax rate leads to the same conclusions. The
total stock of public capital increases with ¯ t, whose real value is a major determinant of the scope
of government. The relationship between the corporate tax rate and the stock of public capital is
robust to changes in the value of the parameters.
3.4.2 Asymmetric countries
Our ﬁnal exercise is to analyse the steady state values when asymmetries between the two countries
are introduced. We consider two cases: asymmetries in θ and in α. The respective results are shown
in Figures 11 and 12.
16Figure 10: Robustness analysis - substitution eﬀect
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When the production of a country relies more on public capital (country A in this simulation),
the government accumulates more public capital than country B. This generates higher rents for the
ﬁrm in country A, so the government sets a higher tax rate. In this case, there is proﬁt shifting from
17country A to county B. If the level of competition is low, then the country with high θ has a higher
output than its partner, but as competition increases and tax rate declines, the negative eﬀect in
public capital is very strong and total output also declines. This suggests that for countries that
depend more on public capital, corporate tax competition might induce signiﬁcant welfare costs.
We now turn to the analysis of the case with diﬀerent α’s. Country A, where α is higher, has a
higher capital stock and higher output than its partner. The government sets a higher tax rate for
this country, so there is proﬁt shifting to country B. It is also interesting to notice that the decline
in public capital is much stronger for country A. In the absence of tax competition, it has a higher
public capital stock, but when competition is more intense, its public capital stock as a share of
output is lower than of the country B.
Figure 11: Asymmetric countries (elasticity of output with respect to public capital)
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Country A: θ = 0.12; country B: θ = 0.04
18Figure 12: Asymmetric countries (elasticity of output with respect to private capital)
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4 Empirical evidence
4.1 Estimation strategy
To access the validity of the main mechanism of our model, we estimate policy functions for the
statutory corporate tax rate (taxit) and for public investment (invit) in the spirit of Devereux,
Lockwood, and Redoano (2008):
taxit = α1invit + α2taxrw
it + α3Xit + εi + ǫit (21)
invit = β1taxit + β2invrw
it + β3Xit + υi +  it
19We use statutory tax rate and not eﬀective marginal tax rate. It is clear from the model that public
investment depends on the statutory tax rate (the true rate of return of generating one extra unit
of rents) and not on the eﬀective marginal tax rate.9
Apart from the endogeneity between the two tools, we also consider the international competition
element. The statutory tax rate also responds to the tax rate of the rest of the world (taxrw
it ).10
Public investment depends on the statutory tax rate, but we also allow it to respond to the level of
public investment of foreign countries (invrw
it ). Although we do not model this element explicitly
with our model, we include it to make the setting more realistic. Moreover, it allows us to identify
the eﬀect of public investment on the tax rate. In the absence of this element, it is hard to ﬁnd
another possible instrument for public investment. Xit is a vector of control variables. We estimate
each equation separately using instrumental variables estimation. The system is exactly identiﬁed:
each equation has one omitted variable that is used as an instrument for the endogenous variable
in the other equation. For the instruments to be valid, it is crucial that the corporate tax rate does
not respond to foreign public investment and public investment does not react to the foreign tax
rate. Although we cannot a priori justify this assumption based on existing evidence, we can test
the validity of the instruments after the estimation.
The estimation of these reaction functions, suﬀers from more problems of endogeneity. The tax
rate and public investment of the rest of the world might react to domestic developments in the
respective variables. Furthermore, some of the controls might also be endogenous to the tax rate or
to public investment. To minimize these problems, we compute a 3 year non overlapping averages.
Each time observation corresponds to 3 years averages. We, then, estimate these equations with
all controls that might be endogenous, as well as the foreign variables entering in lags. Although
we cut the sample size to one third, it still allows us to be much more conﬁdent that our estimator
will be consistent.
The corporate tax and public investment of the rest of the world are weighted averages of the













In the reaction functions we include public investment instead of public capital. Firstly because
9It should be noted that the dependence of public investment on the statutory tax rate exists regardless of the level
of the eﬀective marginal tax rate. Also, this relation persists in a closed economy or in the absence of international
competition.
10It is not our purpose to ﬁnd out if the response to the foreign tax rate is due to competition for proﬁts or for
private investment
20the decision variable of governments is public investment. Secondly, this way we avoid problems
of non-stationarity, because both tax rate and public investment are bound between 0 and 1 and,
therefore, cannot have unit roots. Similarly to Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) we do
not include lagged dependent variables.11
4.2 Data
We estimate the policy functions using a panel of 21 OECD countries. The variable corporate tax
rate was taken from Michigan World Tax Database, and public investment was taken from Kamps
(2006) and expanded with OECD data until 2005.
For robustness purposes, we use three diﬀerent weights to calculate the variables for the rest
of the world: uniform weights (W1), the openness of the economy (W2) and the population (W3).
The correlations between the three measures within a country range from 0.80 to 0.95 for both
variables.
We use the following control variables: government consumption, the ﬁscal surplus, the degree
of openness, GDP growth, the level of private capital, population growth, a dummy for election
year, the % of left wing votes and a dummy if the country joined the EMU2 after 1999. Summary
statistics and the source of each variable can be found in Table A1 in the data appendix.
4.3 Estimation
We estimate the policy functions using IV estimation. Given that we only have 21 countries, we
model the country’s speciﬁc error as ﬁxed eﬀect. In the estimations, we also include country speciﬁc
time trends.
We consider government consumption, the ﬁscal surplus, the degree of openness, GDP growth,
the level of private capital as potentially endogenous, so they enter the equation in lags (previous
non-overlapping 3 year’s average).
We estimate an unrestricted and a restricted model. The unrestricted model includes all controls.
We, then, remove the non-signiﬁcant variables and add them as additional controls. We test the
under-identiﬁcation of each equation and, in the case of the restricted models, we perform the
Sargan over-identiﬁcation test.
11In this way we can still have consistent estimates of the short run coeﬃcients without introducing technical
complications of estimating equations with lagged dependent variables in panel data. For instance, we would have
to estimate the equations in diﬀerences (Arellano and Bond), which would be problematic because there would be
many zeros on the left hand side. If we ignored the bias generated by the lagged dependent variable and estimated
the system in levels, we would have multicollinearity problems between the (taxit−1) and (taxrw
it−1).
21Table 3: Estimation results: corporate tax rate
  W1  W2  W3 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
2.999  2.478  15.224  2.055  4.532***  3.524*** 
t Inv
(0.78)  (1.35)  (0.54)  (1.02)  (2.63)  (2.71) 
0.385***  0.410***  0.342  0.454***  0.427***  0.461*** 
1
rw
t Tax − (3.14)  (3.74)  (1.05)  (4.18)  (3.45)  (4.29) 
0.892*  0.858***  2.165  0.699**  0.951***  0.815*** 
1 t Govcons − (1.92)  (3.2)  (0.68)  (2.34)  (2.89)  (3.07) 
0.038    0.637    0.136   
1 t Budget − (0.17)    (0.47)    (0.85)   
0.007    0.212    0.068   
1 t GDPg − (0.03)    (0.34)    (0.28)   
0.137**  0.128**  0.18  0.116*  0.115  0.105 
1 t Open − (2.05)  (2.12)  (0.94)  (1.92)  (1.59)  (1.64) 
0.628    12.967    2.379   
1 t K − (0.13)    (0.46)    (0.64)   
-4.266***  -4.079***  -7.945  -3.718***  -4.514***  -4.002*** 
t Popg
(-2.83)  (-4.11)  (-0.87)  (-3.65)  (-3.82)  (-4.02) 
-0.255    -0.709    -0.464   
t Election (-0.17)    (-0.22)    (-0.29)   
0.071    0.225    0.086   
t Left
(0.82)    (0.59)    (1.05)   
-0.735    1.391    -0.36   
t Emu
(-0.38)    (0.25)    (-0.19)   
Country trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  245  245  245  245  245  245 
Countries  21  21  21  21  21  21 
R

















&  -  1.160 
[0.979]  -  2.015 
[0.918]  -  1.803 
[0.937] 
Notes: Each observation corresponds to a 3 year average. The subscript t-1 denotes the observation of the 
previous 3 years. The estimation runs from 1966-1969 to 1999-2002. It includes the following countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United 
States. The equations are estimated using Instrumental Variables fixed effects estimation. In columns (1) the 
equation is exactly identify with 
rw
t inv
 as instrument for  t inv
. In columns (2) the non-significant variables 
are excluded from the equation but added as additional instruments. The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, 
*** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent.  
# The underidentification test is an LM test of whether the instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
regressors.  The null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. The test statistic is to be compared to a 
chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments. The p-value is in brackets.  
& The null hypothesis of the Sargan overidentification test is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.  Under the 
null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. The p-value is 
in brackets.  
22Table 4: Estimation results: public investment
  W1  W2  W3 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
0.062**  0.039*  0.066  0.069*  0.077*  0.075** 
t Tax
(1.98)  (1.73)  (1.57)  (1.9)  (1.92)  (2.00) 
0.315*  0.356**  0.233  0.231  0.126  0.125 
1
rw
t Inv − (1.71)  (2.13)  (1.38)  (1.48)  (0.44)  (0.44) 
-0.164***  -0.142***  -0.173***  -0.172***  -0.166***  -0.161*** 
1 t Govcons − (-4.11)  (-4.11)  (-3.91)  (-4.06)  (-3.81)  (-3.82) 
-0.043**  -0.046***  -0.043**  -0.044**  -0.042**  -0.042** 
1 t Budget − (-2.47)  (-2.84)  (-2.44)  (-2.45)  (-2.25)  (-2.28) 
-0.009    -0.01    -0.016   
1 t GDPg − (-0.29)    (-0.31)    (-0.51)   
-0.014    -0.017  -0.018*  -0.017  -0.018* 
1 t Open − (-1.27)    (-1.38)  (-1.7)  (-1.57)  (-1.75) 
-0.711  -0.571  -0.757*  -0.712*  -0.944**  -0.865** 
1 t K − (-1.63)  (-1.53)  (-1.67)  (-1.72)  (-2.14)  (-2.11) 
0.552***  0.467***  0.581***  0.578***  0.590***  0.567*** 
t Popg
(3.16)  (3.10)  (2.90)  (3.11)  (2.96)  (2.96) 
0.015    0.012    0.038   
t Election
(0.08)    (0.06)    (0.18) 
-0.015  -0.013  -0.016  -0.015  -0.016  -0.015 
t Left
(-1.47)  (-1.43)  (-1.52)  (-1.49)  (-1.53)  (-1.47) 
-0.068    -0.05    0.019   
t Emu
(-0.27)    (-0.18)    (0.07)   
Country trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  245  245  245  245  245  245 
Countries  21  21  21  21  21  21 
R

















&  -  2.865 
[0.581]  -  0.151 
[0.985]  -  0.304 
[0.959] 
Notes: Each observation corresponds to a 3 year average. The subscript t-1 denotes the observation of the 
previous 3 years. The estimation runs from 1966-1969 to 1999-2002. It includes the following countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United 
States. The equations are estimated using Instrumental Variables fixed effects estimation n columns (1) the 
equation is exactly identify with 
rw
t tax
 as instrument for  t tax
In columns (2) the non-significant variables are 
excluded from the equation but added as additional instruments. The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** -
statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent.  
# The underidentification test is an LM test of whether the instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
regressors.  The null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. The test statistic is to be compared to a 
chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments. The p-value is in brackets.  
& The null hypothesis of the Sargan overidentification test is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.  Under the 
null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. The p-value is 
in brackets.  
23Table 3 and 4 shows the results. All speciﬁcations have considerable good ﬁt with an R2 above
0.65. Except for the unrestricted speciﬁcation for the corporate tax rate using W2, all regressions
pass the underindentiﬁcation test, suggesting that in general, the rest of the world variables are
valid instruments for the the corresponding domestic variables. Also, in all restricted speciﬁcations
we conclude from the Sargan test that we do no reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are
valid.
There are two important results. Firstly, there is evidence of the endogeneity between the the
two variables, particularly from the corporate tax rate to the public investment. Corporate tax
rate also responds positively to public investment but it is only statistically signiﬁcant when we
use W3 as weights. This result is consistent with our model, as the reaction function of tax rate
was positive, but very ﬂat in the stock of public capital. On the other hand, the result that public
investment increases with the statutory tax rate is quite robust to diﬀerent weighting procedures.
The coeﬃcient ranges from 0.04 to 0.07. For an exogenously driven reduction of 15% of the tax
rate, public investment goes down between 0.6% to 1.1%.
The second result is that there is evidence for international competition particularly in the
corporate tax rate. A country’s tax rate responds close to 0.4% to an increase of 1% in the tax rate
of the rest of the world. This is in line with values reported by Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano
(2008). For public investment, the coeﬃcient of response to the foreign public investment is lower
- between 0.2 and 0.3, but is only signiﬁcant if we use uniform weights.
With respect to the control variables, government consumption, openness and population growth
are, in general, signiﬁcant in both equations. Private capital and ﬁscal surplus are only signiﬁcant
for public investment.
5 Concluding Remarks
The strong downward trend of the statutory corporate tax rates represents one of the most striking
aspects of international competition between governments. The main objective of this paper is to
point out that other consequences of corporate tax rate competition have been overlooked.
Keen and Marchand (1997) argued that tax competition might lead to “too many business
centers and airports but not enough parks or libraries”. In fact, this statement might be inconsistent
with the general decline of public capital stock that has taken place over the last two decades among
many OECD countries.
By contrast, we ﬁnd a negative relationship between tax competition and public capital stock.
The key diﬀerence between these two results is the following. In their setting, the relation between
tax rate and public capital comes from international competition. In the presence of competition,
24there will be a bias in favour of public investment. In our model, this relation exists even in the
absence of competition. Public capital stock increases tax revenue. Because of this positive exter-
nality there is always a bias in favour of public capital. As competition drives tax rate down, this
reduces the externality of public capital and governments have an incentive to reduce their supply.
The robustness analysis we performed provides a strong evidence that the central mechanism of
our paper remains valid. Besides, this link appears to be signiﬁcant for most countries where the
share of public capital stock has, indeed, decreased.
The general equilibrium analysis appears to be extremely helpful since it allows us to assess
quantitatively the eﬀects of competition. We show that tax competition leads to a reduction of
both tax rate and public investment. If tax rate goes down by 15%, public investment in steady
state goes down between 0.2% and 0.4% of GDP. The short run impact is three times stronger.
Our empirical estimates point to slightly higher values: between 0.6% and 1.1% of GDP. Further
empirical evidence indicates that there is international competition in both corporate tax rate and
public investment.
Although tax competition is likely to have a negative eﬀect on the overall supply of public goods,
the traditional view considers that tax competition favours the private sector. This is indeed what
we found in the baseline scenario and it is explained by the fact that a race to the bottom reduces
the net cost of capital. Nevertheless, we found that it exists a threshold tax rate under which tax
competition has a negative eﬀect on total output. This threshold depends crucially on the elasticity
of output with respect to public capital.
We believe that our analysis is particularly relevant for the European Union countries where
enlargement is likely to put more pressure on tax rates and therefore could reinforce the downward
trend of public capital stock in western European countries.
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26Appendix 1 - The General Equilibrium Model
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Appendix 2 - Static model with labour and proﬁt taxation
and optimal policy
In our model we simplify the government’s problem by maximizing the lifetime utility of public
consumption and considering only proﬁt taxation. The purpose of this appendix is to show in that
27the main properties of our model hold in a broader setting. The notation is similar to the main
model.
We consider here that the government maximizes the utility function of the household as de-
scribed by:
U = ln(c) − δn ln(n) + δg ln(g) + δp ln(p)
For simplicity, we ignore the durable nature of public and private capital in order to focus on
the intratemporal problem. Therefore, productive spending are described by the variable p. The
parameters δg and δp describe the preferences of the representative household and δn describes the
disutility of labour. Private consumption, denoted c, depends on distortionary taxes on labour, τn,
and corporate proﬁt, Υ.
c = wn(1 − τn) + Υ
The consumer chooses the hours of work and consumption according to the following ﬁrst order
condition:
wn(1 − τn) = δnc
The corporate sector borrows capital from the outside and it has to repay it after production. The
production takes place according to the following production function:
y = F(k,n,p) = kαpθn1−α−θ
The declared proﬁts of the representative ﬁrm are described below. As in the main model, s
represents the proﬁt shifted to an outside country and proﬁt shifting operations have the cost bs2
Π = [y − wn − s]
The corporate section maximizes after tax proﬁts where the amount of proﬁt shifted will pay ˘ τπ,
the corporate tax of the outside country. The objective function and the ﬁrst order conditions
describing the behaviour of the corporate section are as follows:











In this appendix, we examine the case where the government follows an optimal policy, but has
only labour and proﬁt taxation to raise revenue. The objective function is therefore to maximize
consumers utility subject to the following constraints:
28g + p = (1 − α − θ)yτn + (α + θ)yτπ −
τπ − ˘ τπ
b
τπ
δnc = (1 − α − θ)y(1 − τn)
r = FK(1 − τπ)
y = c + i + g + p −
τπ − ˘ τπ
b
−
(τπ − ˘ τπ)2
b
The ﬁrst constraint is the government budget constraint. The second is the consumers ﬁrst order
condition. The third is the ﬁrms optimality condition on capital and the ﬁnal equation is the
aggregate resource constraints. There are two sources of waste. One is that proﬁts are shift to the
foreign country, and the second is the cost the ﬁrm pays to shift them. The lagrangean for the
government’s problem is given by:


















= Λ2δn − Λ4
n :
−δn
n − Λ1[(1 − α − θ)τnFN + (α + θ)FNτπ] + Λ2(1 − α − θ)(1 − τn)FN




= −Λ1 − Λ4
p :
δp
p = −Λ1[1 − (1 − α − θ)τnFP − (α + θ)τπFP] − Λ2[(1 − α − θ)(1 − τn)FP]
+Λ3[FKP(1 − τπ)] + Λ4(1 − FP) = 0
k :
−Λ1[(1 − α − θ)FKτn + (α + θ)FKτπ] + Λ2[(1 − α − θ)(1 − τn)FK − δnc]
+Λ3[FKK(1 − τπ)] + Λ4[1 − FK] = 0
τn : Λ1[(1 − α − θ)y] − Λ2[(1 − α − θ)y] = 0
τπ : Λ1[−(α + θ)y +
2τπ − ˘ τπ
b
] − Λ3FK − Λ4[
2(τπ − ˘ τπ) + 1
b
] = 0
When choosing the unproductive public good, the government looks at the marginal beneﬁt to
the consumer and the marginal cost. The marginal cost consists on two elements: the resources
used (Λ4) as well as the cost in terms of distorting taxation that needs to be raised (Λ1). When
choosing the productive good, the government will consider two additional elements. As in the
model presented in the main text, the government considers that the increase in productive good,
increases the marginal productivity of factors, as well as proﬁts, so it enlarges the tax base, both for
29corporate as well as labour income taxation. Additionally, the government considers the marginal
eﬀect on private capital (Λ3) and that, by aﬀecting the output it will raise total resources (Λ4).
The tax rates are set to equate marginal cost of the distortion and the beneﬁt of raising rev-
enue. In the case of corporate taxation there will be two additional elements when we include the
possibility of proﬁt shifting. Governments know that when they increase corporate tax rate, part
of the revenue will be lost to the other country Λ1[2τ
π−˘ τ
π
b ], but besides this they know that the
resources that are transfer abroad reduce the resources available to consume at home. Notice that
as b or ˘ τπ declines, the optimal tax rate will go down, which will also reduce the public investment.
Appendix 3
Table A1
Variable Description Mean Sd Max Min Source
Inv Public investment (% GDP) 3.499 1.504 10.09 0.770 Kamps (2006)
Tax Top bracket corporate tax 38.21 8.730 56.41 7.148 Michigan World Tax Database
Govcons Gov. consumption (% GDP) 17.66 4.511 30.14 7.325 OECD-Main Economic Indicators
Budget Budget surplus (% GDP) -2.212 3.851 18.00 -15.71 IMF- IFS
GDPg GDP growth 2.778 2.639 12.48 -7.283 IMF- IFS
Popg Population growth 0.660 0.569 3.799 -4.526 WB - WDI
Open Openness (% GDP) 54.77 29.29 184.2 7.416 WB - WDI
Capital Private capital (% GDP) 2.512 0.541 3.818 1.255 Kamps (2006)
Left Left party votes (% total) 37.96 14.15 67.6 0 Comparative parties dataset
Election Dummy for election year 0.316 0.465 1 0 Comparative parties dataset
Note: the comparative party dataset was created by Duane Swank and is avail-
able on http://www.mu.edu/polisci/Swank.htm.
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